Ary Spaans v. Iran – United States Claims Tribunal

Spaans, a Dutch citizen, worked for the Iran – United States Claims Tribunal- located in the Hague – as an interpreter from 1981 to 1982. He filed a lawsuit against the Tribunal before the District Court of the Hague, complaining the termination of his employment.

The Tribunal appeared in the national proceeding, invoking its jurisdictional immunity to which it would had been entitled as an international organization possessing international legal personality. Indeed, the Tribunal was established pursuant to the Declaration of the Government of the the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria (General Declaration) and the Declaration of the Government of the the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria concerning the settlement of claims by the Government of the United States and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Claims Settlement Declaration) of 19 January 1981, as a result of the conclusion of an agreement between Iran and United States. The host State, the United States and Iran had begun discussions on the possible conclusion of an agreement aimed at regulating the status, privileges and immunities granted to the Tribunal in the Netherlands. However, no such agreement was ever reached. Nevertheless, this circumstance would not prevent the recognition of the Tribunal’s immunity from Dutch jurisdiction, which would be based on customary international law. As pointed out by the respondent, the Dutch government has publicly recognized that the Tribunal was entitled to enjoy in Netherlands the immunities conferred, under international customary law, on international organizations and necessary for the performance of their institutional functions.

The District Court rejected the preliminary objection raised by the respondent organization and held that Dutch court had jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes between the Tribunal and its employees. According to the District Court, the conclusion of a a private law employment contract entailed a commercial activity falling into the category of acta jure gestionis, excluded from the scope of jurisdictional immunity. In other words, the District Court determined the scope of the Tribunal’s immunity, by relying on the analogy with the legal regime of State immunity.

The Tribunal appealed the District Court’s preliminary judgment. The case was settled by the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court firstly examined whether the respondent organization had the right to invoke immunity from the jurisdiction of Dutch courts, despite the absence of any explicitly established treaty provision.

In this regard, it stressed that State immunity and international organizations immunities give rise to two different sets of legal questions. As far as international organizations are concerned, two conflicting interests must be taken into account: the protection of the independent exercise of functions by the organization and the interest of the private individual in dispute with the organization in resolving that dispute before an independent and impartial judicial body.

As the Court affirmed, treaties granting privileges and immunities to international organizations resolve the conflict between these interests by granting the immunity from the jurisdiction of the host State and providing for an exception to this principle and obliging the international organization to provide alternative modes of dispute resolution.

In light of the above, the Court held that “it must be assumed that, even in the absence of such a treaty, it follows from unwritten international law that an international organization, at least in the State on whose territory that organization is established with the consent of the government of that State, is entitled to the privilege of immunity from jurisdiction on the same basis as is customary in the above-mentioned treaties.”

The Court also clarified the scope of immunity, which would be granted to international organizations under general international law. In this regard, the Court considered it relevant that most of the exceptions and limitations to the immunities of organizations provided for in the treaties concern commercial activities or particular forms of non-contractual liability. It would follow that, under current customary international law, an international organization is not, in principle, subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of the host State in all disputes directly related to the performance of its institutional functions.

However, the Supreme Court , overturning the conclusions of the District Court, held that labour disputes cannot be considered commercial activities excluded from the privilege of immunity. As it underlined “disputes directly related to the performance of the functions of the international organization include, in any case, labour disputes that may arise between the organization and the employees which play an essential role in the performance of the organization’s institutional functions.”

According to the Court of Appeal, the applicant played a key role in the performance of the institutional tasks of the Tribunal. As a result, the judgment of appeal stated that national courts lacked jurisdiction to rule the case.

Furthermore, the Court noted that the respondent organization had offered the applicant an employment contract that provided for an internal special procedure as the means of resolving disputes arising from that contract. However, as he himself admitted, Spaans refused to sign the proposed contract. The absence of alternative means of dispute resolution cannot therefore affect the conclusion regarding the Tribunal’s immunity from the applicant’s action.